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ASSAULTS ON THE YOUNG AND OLD 
This paper will survey the development of law concerning 
assaults on the young and the elderly with special emphasis on 
recently enacted and amended statutory provisions. Specifically, 
this discussion of assaultive conduct focuses on Penal Code Sec-
tion 22.04, Injury to a Child or an Elderly Individual, and re-
lated provisions in the Texas Penal Code and Code of Criminal 
Procedure. Not addressed will be the recodified but familiar 
sections of the Penal Code dealing with Sexual Assault of a child 
(Section 22 . 011) or Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child (Section 
22.021) . Also not included in this paper are materials dealing 
with the new crime of Violation of Court Order, a distinct of-
fense created to criminalize violation of protective orders is-
sued under Section 71.11 of the Texas Family Code. For more in-
formation on this subject, see the article entitled "Legal Reme-
dial Alternatives for Spouse Abuse in Texas" included in these 
course materials. 
Many of the statutory provisions considered here are in whole 
or in part the product of recent legislation. Some of what fol-
lows is, •therefore, necessarily conjecture based on legislative 
history, trends, and decisions under similar provisions in current 
or prior law. 
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INJURY TO A CHILD OR ELDERLY INDIVIDUAL 
I . Generally 
A. Prior Law . 
As regards children, this offense was previously codified 
in Article 1148a of the Penal Code, a provision that was not 
added until 1971. The original statute prohibited the inten-
tional maiming, disfiguring, or battering of a child 14 years 
of age or younger by any person, including the parent of the 
child. The prohibition extended to engaging in conduct by omis-
sion or commission which was intended to cause any physical in-
jury or deformity or deficiency to such a child. In essence, the 
inclusion of omissions with intent to cause the proscribed re-
sult established a special duty of care standard with respect to 
those 14 years and younger. 
Violation of Article 1148a was the equivalent of a third 
degree felony, and no distinction was made in levels of cul-
pability or degree of injury in ascertaining the punishment. 
It was, however, a defense that the assault was committed by a 
parent, guardian, master (over an apprentice}, or teacher and 
was "done in the exercise of the right of moderate restraint or 
correction . . . " See TEX. PENAL CODE art. 1148a (Vernon 1971). 
The elderly were not protected by a specific article in the 
former code, but the aggravated assault statute did recognize a 
category of assault involving the elderly and infirm. See TEX. 
PENAL CODE art. 1147(4} (Vernon 1971} . Under that provision, 
















variety of circumstances, one of which was "[w]hen committed by 
a person of robust health or strength upon one who is aged or 
decrepit." TEX. PENAL CODE art. 1147(4) (Vernon 1971). The 
punishment range for aggravated assault under the prior Code 
was by fine of $25 to $1,000 or imprisonment from one month to 
two years, or both. TEX. PENAL CODE art. 1148 (Vernon 1950). 
When the present Penal Code was enacted, assaults to children 
were covered by Section 22.04, but assaults on the elderly were 
covered only under the general provisions pertaining to all adult~ . 
The look of Section 22.04, had, however, changed dramatically. 
The offense was now tied to all four levels of culpability re-
sulting in either serious bodily injury, serious physical or 
mental deficiency or impairment, or deformity to a child 14 years 
of age or younger. Responsibility by omission or failure to act 
was retained, and the offense was punished much more severely, 
as a second degree felony. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04 
·(Vernon 1974). 
B. The Present Code. 
One of the most striking historical features of the current 
section dealing with assaults to children and the elderly is 
its ephemeral . nature. Since its adoption, it has been amended 
{often substantially) repeatedly. In 1977, the format of the 
level of injury sustained was altered by listing "serious bodily 
injury;" "serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment;" 
and "disfigurement or deformity" as distinct categories of in-
jury. Also, very importantly, the 1977 amendment distinguished 
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the level of punishment by relating it to the level of culpability 
employed in commission of the crime. If it was done with reck-
lessness or criminal negligence, the punishment dropped to the 
third degree felony range. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04 
(Vernon Supp. 1978) • 
The Section was further amended in 1979 by adding "bodily 
injury" to the list of injury levels proscribed by the statute . 
With this addition came a separate punishment provision for in-
fliction of this least serious resulting harm. TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. Sec. 22.04 (Vernon Supp. 1980). 
Finally, in 1981 the Legislature reshaped the coverage of 
the statute to cover assaults on the elderly, defined as those 
65 years of age or older, and continued the development of its 
punishment scheme based on a combination of culpability and 
level of injury. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04 (Vernon Supp. 
1982-83). The result of this reliance on various factors to de-
fine punishment is a convoluted and often confusing set of ele-
ments of proof and a jury charge that may be truly baffling. 
II. Elements of the Offense 
A person commits the offense of Injury to a Child or Elderly 
!ndividual if he: 
[1] (a) intentionally; 
(b) knowingly; 
(c) recklessly; or 




















(2] by act or omission engages in conduct that causes 
[3] (a) serious bodily injury; 
(b) serious physical or mental deficiency or impair-
ment; 
(c) disfigurement or deformity; or 
(d) bodily injury 
(4] (a) to a child who is 14 years or younger or 
(b) to an individual who is 65 years or older. 
a. Proof of Culpability 
Section 22.04 is one of the few sections of the Penal Code 
to employ all four levels of culpability in defining an offense. 
Indeed, it is one of the few to base criminal responsibility on 
negligence. As might be expected, a number of cases decided 
since the introduction of culpability as the primary determinator 
of punishment have explored the evidence of culpability and 
interpreted its application to this statute. [The general defi-
nitions of culpability relating to criminal offenses are found in 
Penal Code Section 6.03.] 
One of the more instructive cases involving intent to injure 
a child is Beggs v. State, 597 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). 
In Beggs, the defendant requested a mistake of fact instruction 
on evidence that, in placing her granddaughter in scalding hot 
bathwater, she operated under the reasonable mistaken belief that 
the water was of a normal temperature. The trial court refused her 
requested charge, and the State argued on appeal that she was not 
- 5 -
J 
entitled to the charge since the wording of the statute that 
the actor "engages in conduct that causes . serious bodily 
injury; • • • " should be read as requiring only a showing that 
defendant intentionally or knowingly engaged in the conduct; not 
that she did so intending to cause the resulting injury. 597 
S.W.2d at 376. 
Noting that the real difference between Section 22.04 
and the general assault provisions of Section 22.01 and 22.02 
is that Section 22.04 adds a stiffer penalty for assaults 
against children, the Beggs Court rejected the State's contention. 
597 S.W.2d at 377. The Court equated the "intentionally or 
knowingly" allegation of culpability in the indictment to be 
the equivalent of an allegation " . • . (1) that it was her 
conscious objective or desire to cause serious bodily injury and 
(2) that she was aware that her conduct was reasonably certain 
to cause serious bodily injury." 597 S.W. 2d at 377. 
After this holding in Beggs, it was anticlimactic for the 
Court to find the requested charge required if the ev idence 
demonstrated a reasonable mistaken belief on the part of the 
defendant concerning a matter of fact (the temperature of the 
water) which belief negated a conscious objective or desire to 
cause serious bodily injury or an awareness that her conduct was 
reasonably certain to cause serious bodily injury. 597 S.W.2d 
at 378. In other words, if a reasonable mistake about the 
water's temperature would have negated defendant's culpability, 
here intent or knowledge , the trial court was obliged to give 






















The deceased, a 37 month-old child, was brought to the hospital 
severely bruised with no pulse or respiration. At the time of 
the death, the child was having a period of visitation with her 
father, the defendant. In holding the evidence sufficient to 
establish the intent of the defendant to cause serious bodily 
injury, the Court relied on testimony by the mother that the child 
had no bruises when she was picked up by the defendant for the 
visitation and the testimony by the treating physicians and medi-
cal examiner that some of the many bruises found on the body were 
less than seventy-two hours old. 635 S.W.2d at 795. 
The Whitely Court also considered an extrajudicial confession 
in which the defendant admitted having hit the deceased child on 
the side of her head at least four times. Since the medical 
examiner's testimony was that the cause of death was blunt trauma 
to the head which could have been caused by a hand, the Court 
held the statement adequately corroborated and the evidence suffi-
cient, notwithstanding the physical evidence contradicting the 
mother's testimony that the child was previously unmarked . 635 
S.W.2d at 796-97. 
Recklessness was the level of culpability alleged in Hooker v. 
State, 621 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Crim. App . 1980). Again, the evidence 
was circumstantial, consisting of a peculiar pattern of burns ap-
parently caused by placing the child in very hot water for a long 
period and the somewhat ambiguous e~cited utterance of the defen-
dant, "It's my fault, I did it." 621 S.W.2d at 599-600. 
Recklessness, of course, requires only an awareness on the 




















that a result will occur or that circumstances exist. TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. Sec. 6.03(c) (Vernon 1974). The Court had no trouble 
finding in Hooker that the circumstantial evidence excluded all 
reasonable hypotheses other than the guilt of the accused, and 
that the jury was justified in finding that the conduct was en-
gaged in recklessly . 621 S.W.2d at 601- 02. 
Criminal negligence differs from recklessness in that the 
actor need not actually be aware of the substantial and unjusti~ 
fiable risk; it is sufficient if he "ought to be aware" of the 
r.isk . TEX . PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 6.03(d} (Vernon 1974). Although 
the defendant in Phillips v. State, 588 S.W. 2d 378 (Tex . Crim . App . 
1979), did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of his 
criminal negligence, he did attack the standard of care imposed 
on a defendant by the statutory definition of criminal negl i gence 
as unconstitutionally vague. 588 S.W.2d at 380. 
Citing Lewis v. State, 529 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975} , 
a case upholding the criminally negligent homicide statute against 
similar attack, and Nabors v . State, a case upholding the consti-
tutionality of the predecessor of Section 22 . 04 (Article 1148aic)), 
the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected appellant's claim. The 
Court i n Phillips noted that the law could not poss i bly anticipate 
all situations in which an actor's conduct would be a gross devi -
ation from the standard of care expected of an "ordinary person" 
under the circumstances . 588 S . W.2d at 381. Criminal rtegligence 
as defined by Section 6.03(d} provides adequate notice of the 
requirements of law and the conduct forbidden. 
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b. The Act Requirement 
In Texas, every offense requires voluntary conduct together 
with the required level of culpability. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN . 
Sec. 6.01 (Vernon 1974). This voluntary conduct may be an act, 
an omission, or possession. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 6.0l(a) 
(Vernon 1974). Where an omission to act is the basis for the 
offense, one is criminally responsible only when a statute pro-
vides that the omission is an offense or otherwise establishes 
a duty to act . TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 6.0l(c) (Vernon 1974) . 
It will be remembered that one of the peculiar features of 
Section 22.04 is its specific reference to commission of the 
offense with the requisite mental state "by act or omission," 
resulting in one of the levels of injury to a child or elderly 
person. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-83). 
It is easy to hypothesize situations in which the defendant, 
whether he be parent, babysitter, or teacher, injures the child 
or elderly person (especially where the elderly are under the 
care of a professional care-giver as in a nursing home) by 
failing to do that which is required. The difficulty often comes 
in determining just what duty is established by law. 
The duties of a parent are established by statute with some 
specificity. See TEX . FAM . CODE ANN. Sec. 12 . 04 (Vernon 1974) . 
Among these are the provision of medical care, food, shelter , 
clothing, and education. Id. In an Injury to a Child case in-
volving the failure of a parent to provide medical care to a 
child, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed responsibility by 





















The Court held in Ronk that since an omission does not form 
the basis for criminal responsibility unless a statute so provides, 
the omission reference of Section 22.04 is operative only when 
a specific statute creating a duty exists. 544 S.W.2d at 125. 
Of course, the parents' duty to provide medical care is well esta-
blished by the Family Code, but in Ronk the indictment contained 
no allegation that the defendant stood in that relationship with 
the injured child. 544 S.W.2d at 124. Failure to allege are-
lationship which places the accused under a statutory duty to 
act is a fundamental defect in a charging instrument for Injury 
to a Child or Elderly Individual. 544 S.W.2d at 125. 
In a more recent case in which the parental relationship 
was properly alleged in the indictment, the Court of Criminal 
Appeals explored the sufficiency of the evidence in an Injury to 
a Child case charging failure to provide food and medical treat-
rnent resulting in the death of a four and half month old baby. 
Ahearn v. State, 588 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The 
indictment alleged that the defendants acted with recklessness 
or criminal negligence and that ''serious physical deficiency" 
resulted. 588 S.W.2d at 329. 
The defendants in Ahearn had apparently sought no medical 
care for their deceased child although it was available at no 
cost. Also, there was ample evidence that they had left the 
child unattended for long periods of time in filthy conditions 
while his condition deteriorated. 588 S.W.2d at 337. Since it 
was alleged that the physical condition was caused reckless·ly 
or with criminal negligence, the Court held that it was not neces-
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sary for the State to prove either the specific causes of the 
ailments or that the defendants specifically intended the re-
sults. 588 S.W.2d at 337. 
c. Proof of Resulting Injury 
The third element of Injury to a Child or Elderly Individual 
is the measurement of the injury involved in terms of its serious-
ness. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04(a) (Vernon Supp . 1982-83) . 
Language from the previous Code has been retained, but "bodily 
injury" will now also suffice to establish criminal responsibility . 
Id . 
"Serious bodily injury" is perhaps the highest level of in-
jury contemplated by the statute . The term is defined by the 
Penal Code as, "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of 
death or that causes death, serious permanent disfigurement, or 
protracted loss or ,impairment of the function of any bodily mem-
ber or organ." TEX . PENAL CODE ANN. Sec . 1.07(a) (34) (Vernon 1974) . 
Since the second and third injury levels are, respectively, 
"serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment" and "dis-
figurement or deformity," it might be thought that these re-
sulting injuries are already described within the term "serious 
bodily injury." But in Morter v. State, 551 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1977), the Court of Criminal Appeals drew a sharp 
distinction between the kinds of injury to which the statute is 
addressed. In Morter, the indictment alleged that the defendant 





















court, in apply ing the law to the facts, permitted a conviction 
if the jury found that the defendant caused either "serious 
physical deficiency or impairment" or "deformity." 551 S.W.2d at 
718. 
Acknowledging that the Penal Code does not define deficiency , 
impairment, or deformity, the Court held in Morter that no pre-
sumption of redundancy arises simply because there is no statu-
tory definition. 551 S.W.2d at 718 . Further, the Court con-
cluded that the Legislature must have intended some purpose for 
every word of its enactment and, therefqre, Section 22 . 04 pro-
scribes three types of conduct (now four types) . 551 S.W.2d at 
718. Permitting the jury to convict on any level of injury found 
when serious bodily injury was alleged in the indictment was 
therefore fundamen~al error. 551 S.W.2d at 718-19. 
Unquestionably, there is some overlap in any ordinary reading 
of the injuries proscribed. For example, "serious physical • •• 
impairment., seems virtually the same as "protracted . . . impair-
ment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Compare 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN . Sec. 22.04(a) (Vernon 1982-83) with TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 1.07(a) (34) (Vernon 1974) . Only the require-
ment that serious bodily injury involve "protracted" impairment 
separates the two in any meaningful way . In short, the serious 
bodily injury definition i s actually a bit more restrictive in 
this regard than the language of Section 22 . 04 suggests. 
In a proper case, it would seem, therefore, that notwith-
standing the holding in Morter, an indictment alleging "serious 
bodily injury" should support a conviction where the proof was 
of "serious physical impairment." And perhaps more important 
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than these semantic subtleties is the obvious fact that proof 
of either level of injury would result in precisely the same 
punishment under Section 22.04. See "Punishment," infra . 
If "serious bodi ly injury" has been alleged, numerous cases 
e x ist construing the meaning of the statutory definition and the 
sufficiency of proof on this point. Many of these cases arise 
in other contexts, such as aggravated assault, aggravated robbery, 
simple assault, murder, and even terroristic threat. 
While cases testing the sufficiency of evidence of serious 
bodily injury under Section 22 . 04 or its predecessor are less 
common, a general sense of the term may be had from a review of 
some of them. For instance, death clearly constitutes serious 
bodily injury, Whitely v . State, 635 S . W. 2d 791, 792 (Tex. App. -
Tyler 1982, no pet.), as does loss of an eye, hand and wrist . 
Phillips v. State, 588 S . W.2d 378, 379- 80 (Tex . Crirn. App . 1979) . 
Serious bodily injury was also established by second degree 
burns that caused a serious threat of death. Hooker v . State, 
621 S.W. 2d 597, 600-01 (Tex. Crim. App . 1980). Of course, not 
all burns, even those creating scars , will necessarily constitute 
serious bodily injury . Cf. Morter v. State, 551 S . W. 2d 715, 717 
(Tex. Crim . App . 1977) [physician testified on direct and cross 
exami natio n that burns inflicted on the child did not amount to 
serious bodily injury as it was defined for him]. 
In Pickering v. State, 596 S . W. 2d 124 (Tex . Crim. App. 1980), 
the Court held that bruises that healed without medication and 
t hat were not symptomatic of injuries causing future medical prob-
lems would not be classified as serious bodily i njury. 596 S.W. 2d 












cigarette which formed the letters "i-c-r-y" were held not bo be 
serious bodily injury absent evidence that the child's skin would 
be scarred sufficiently to cause protracted loss or impairment 
of the function of a bodily member or organ . 596 S.W.2d at 128. 
One wonders whether the Pickering case would have had a different 
result with respect to the proof of injury if the State had al-
leged "disfigurement or deformity" instead of serious bodily in-
jury. 
"Serious physical or mental deficiency or impairment," the 
second category of injury in Section 22.04, is not defined in the 
Penal Code. The Court of Criminal Appeals, in Ahearn v. State, 
588 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), noted in considering the 
meaning of the term that "[a] deficiency does not have to cause 
or contribute to death before a jury is warranted in finding it 
'serious.'" 588 S.W.2d at 336. In finding evidence of serious 
physical deficiency sufficient, the Court considered the severely 
emaciated condition of the deceased child's body together with 
the "nature, extent and variety" of his injuries. Id. 
Appellants also contended in Ahearn that the phrase "serious 
physical deficiency" should be defined for the jury in the court's 
charge, and that its inherent vagueness rendered it unconstitutional . 
588 S.W.2d at 337. Citing King v. State, the Court held that the 
term "serious physical deficiency" was the sort of simple, common 
language used in its ordinary meaning that jurors are supposed 
to know without further definition by the trial court. 588 S.W.2d 
at 337-38. 
Nor did the Court find the term vague. The appellants in Ahearn 
were adequately apprised of the meaning of the term since persons 
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of ordinary intelligence need not necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application. 588 S.W.2d at 338; 
see Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 u.s. 156, 92 
s.ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). 
The same result may be expected to obtain from consideration 
of the mental deficiency or impairment segment of the statute. 
In Vaughn v. State, 530 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975), the 
Court held evidence that the defendant had kissed and licked the 
back of the child sufficient to establish mental deficiency or 
impairment on testimony from a psychologist that the victim could 
reasonably be expected to suffer psychological damage in the 
future. 530 S.W.2d at 561. Vaughn's willingness to consider 
sufficient highly speculative evidence of possible future mental 
impairment clearly demonstrates the latitude the Court is willing 
to allow in these cases. 
The third kind of injury supporting a conviction under Section 
22.04 is "disfigurement or deformity," another term not statutorily 
defined. As previously noted, these injuries would seem included 
within the definition of serious bodily injury, and in some cases 
they may be treated in that way. For example, if the disfigure-
ment is not permanent, it is not serious bodily injury but may be 
"disfigurement" within the meaning of the Section 22.04 term. See 
Pickering v. State, 596 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) {holding 
that burns on the back of the child were not serious bodily injury 
since they would not cause permanent disfigurement] • 
Presumably, "disfigurement or deformity" needs no definition 
in the court's charge. Cf. Ahearn v. State, 588 S.W.2d 327, 





















lead in Ahearn, it will also reject claims that the phrase is 
unconstitutionally vague. Id . 
Of course, all of this bodes ill for those defending persons 
accused of assaulting children or the elderly since the jury is 
left without guidance in applying these terms, and the Court 
has been reluctant to find, as a matter of law, that the evidence 
in such cases, no matter how slight, is insufficient. None of 
this is particularly surprising in light of the distasteful nature 
of these prosecutions and the often egregious circumstances in-
volved . But it is in precisely such cases that the jury should 
be given as little leeway as possible in bringing emotional reac-
tion to bear on findings of fact . Moreover, even if a definition 
is given the jury, the breadth of the three most serious levels 
of injury described in Section 22.04 arguably provide more than 
adequate opportunities for application of the harshest penalty 
provided by the statute. 
If by chance the evidence in a case does not prove any of the 
three most debilitating varieties of injury, an offense is never-
theless committed upon infliction of "bodily injury," the fourth 
level of injury in Section 22.04. This term is, of course, statu-
torily defined and used throughout the Penal Code. 
"Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impair-
ment of physical condition. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN . Sec. l.07(a) (7) 
(Vernon 1974). It is difficult to imagine any level of injury so 
slight that it would not be encompassed by this definition unless 
it amounts to no more than an offensive touching, a minor assault 
in its own right. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.0l(a} (3) 
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(Vernon 1974). For instance, a conviction for injury to a child 
was had on evidence that the defendant choked and struck his 
child. Skelton v. State, 626 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. App. - Texarkana 
1981, no pet.). Indeed, it is difficult to find any cases where 
appellants complain about sufficiency of the evidence to prove 
that bodily injury was done. 
If the use of bodily injury as a predicate for criminal 
responsibility seems redundant in light of the simple assault 
statute, bear in mind that the punishment range for injury to a 
child or elderly individual involving bodily injury falls in 
either the third degree felony or Class A misdemeanor range. In 
Skelton v. State, the Court of Appeals refused a claim that the 
defendant was entitled to a charge on the lesser included offense 
of simple assault, pointing out that the distinguishing factor 
involved is the age of the victim. If a child is involved, the 
simple assault becomes "aggravated." Skelton v. State, 626 S.W.2d 
589 (Tex. App. -Texarkana 1981, no pet.). 
d. Age of the Victim 
Since it is the youth or advanced age of the victim that 
renders the assault "aggravated" and susceptible of a harsher 
punishment, proof of the age of the victim is an important 
element under Section 22 . 04. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 
22.04{a) {Vernon Supp. 1982-83). For purposes of the statute, 
a "child" is one 14 years of age or younger, and an "elderly 






















The phrase '' 14 years of age of younger" has been construed 
to include all children who have not attained their fifteenth 
birthday. Phillips v. State, 588 S.W . 2d 378, 380 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1979). This interpretation is based on the rule of con-
struction codified in the Penal Code that "(a] person attains a 
specified age on the day of the anniversary of his birthdate." 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 1.06 (Vernon 1974). One assumes that 
application of this rule to the elderly is markedly simpler; an 
individual who has attained his sixty-fifth birthday is covered 
by the statute. 
In an interesting case involving the age of the victim in a 
prosecution under Section 22.04, the Court of Appeals held that 
knowledge of the age of victim was not a requisite element and 
need not be pled or proved. Huff v. State, 660 S.W.2d 635, 638 
(Tex. App. - Corpus Christi 1983). The Huff Court also upheld a 
denial of jury instruction on mistake of fact defense because there 
was no evidence before the trial court that the defendant had 
formed a mistaken belief regarding the complainant's age. Id. 
While it is true that Section 22.04 does not, on its face, re-
quire knowledge of the age of the victim by the accused, refusal 
of a mistake of fact instruction would seem to be improper in a 
case in which _the evidence properly raised a reasonable mistaken 
belief as to the victim's age. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 8 . 02 
(Vernon 1974); Lynch v. State, 643 S.W. 2d 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). 
The Huff case is a good example of the kind of situation giving 
rise to the defense. The complainant, although a "child," was 
6'1" tall, weighed 195 pounds and owned his own shrimp boat. 660 
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S.W.2d at 638. It is not hard to imagine that a reasonable 
mistaken belief concerning age might have been shown by defen-
dant and believed by the jury. If so, he could still have been 
convicted of any lesser included offense of which he would be 
guilty if the fact were as he believed. TEX. PENAL CODE Sec. 
8.02(b) (Vernon 1974). 
The question would then turn on whether assault is a lesser 
included offense of Injury to a Child or Elderly Individual. 
While proof of assault is established by the same or less than 
all the facts required to establish an offense under Section 
22.04, it is arguably not true that assault differs from Injury 
to a Child only in a lesser injury being required, a lesser cul-
pable mental state sufficing, or in one constituting an attempt 
to commit the other. See TEX. CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 37.09 
(Vernon 1981). 
No court seems to have addressed this point, although two 
cases have discussed similar problems. In Sanford v. State, 
634 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982), the Court refused to 
reverse a conviction for aggravated assault on the grounds that 
the victim was 14 years of age or younger. Appellant relied 
on the rule that a specific statute will control a general on~, 
but the Court, after recognizing that proof of a Section 22.04 
violation was present, refused to reverse, noting that the of-
fense of which appellant was found guilty was of a lesser grade 
and involved a lesser punishment than Injury to a Child or 
Elderly Individual. 634 S.W.2d at 851-52. 

























1981, no pet.), the Court rejected appellant's contention that 
the trial court should have charged on the "lesser included 
offense of assault." Id. at 592. Since evidence of the victim's 
age was adduced, the assault proven was "aggravated" under 
Section 22.04 and no charge on a lesser included offense was 
required. Id. 
Regardless of whether assault is held to be a lesser included 
offense of Injury to a Child or Elderly Individual, the mistake 
of fact defense remains a viable and increasingly important d(~ ·~ 
fensive option in these cases. The oversized "child" in Huff 
may appear again, but more common will be the youthful . appearing 
elderly person . If Section 22.04 is not to become a strict lia-
bility offense, mistake of fact concerning age must be recognized 
as a valid defensive issue without regard to whether knowledge is 
an element of the offense. See Lynch v. State, 643 S.W.2d 737 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1983). The reasonableness of a mistaken belief 
about age, especially of an elderly individual, will probably be 
far less difficult to prove than the reasonableness of many other 
"mistakes" affecting culpability. 
III. Procedural Considerations 
To aid in obtaining evidence for the prosecution of c ases 
under Section 22.04, the Legislature enacted Article 18.021 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1981. See TEX. CODE CRIM . 
PRO. ANN. art. 18.021 (Vernon Supp. 1982-83). This provision 
specifically permits the obtaining of a search warrant to search 
for and photograph a child alleged to be the victim of any of 
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the following: (a) injury to a child [Section 22.04); (b) sexual 
assault of a child [Section 22.0ll(a)] or aggravated sexual 
assault of a child [Section 22.021]. Session Laws, 68th Legis-
lature, Ch. 977, p. 5311, 5319 (1983). 
The purpose of this special warrant is to obtain access to 
the injured child while the injuries are still of evidentiary 
value. Of course, where a parent or guardian brings the child 
forth to report the abusive conduct of another, no warrant is 
required. It is worth noting at this point that a parent wil-
ling to testify against the abuser will not be foreclosed from 
doing so by the husband-wife privilege. One of the few excep-
tions permitting voluntary testimony by one spouse against another 
is "in any case for an offense involving any grade of assault or 
violence committed by one •.• against the child of either under 
16 years of age •.•. " TEX. CODE CRI.M. PRO. ANN. art. 38.11 
(Vernon 1979) • 
Similarly, when the injury is discovered by a treating physi-
cian, teacher or babysitter, nothing prevents that person from 
photographing the injury and giving it to the police or testifying 
at trial. The application of Article 18.021 is therefore limited 
in practice to those cases in which abuse is alleged and no one 
brings the child forth. 
Probable cause is required for such a warrant as in other 
cases. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 18.0l(f) (Vernon Supp. 
1982-83). Additionally, the affidavit supportin~ the warrant 
must set forth facts showing: (a) that a specific offense has 


































been a victim of the offense; (c) that evidence of the offense 
or evidence that a particular person committed the offense .can 
be detected by photographic means; and (d) that the person to 
be searched for and photographed is located at the particular 
place to be searched. Id. 
A warrant issued must in turn identify the child to be lo-
cated and photographed, specify the place or thing to be searched, 
and command any peace officer of the proper county to search 
for and cause the child to be photographed. TEX. CODE CRIM . 
PRO. ANN . art. 18.02l(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-83). In executing 
the warrant, the officer may be accompanied by a photographer 
acting at the direction of the officer. This photographer has 
the right of access to the child under authority of the warrant. 
TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 18.02l(b) (Vernon Supp. 1982-83). 
Interestingly, a warrant obtained under Article 18.021 must 
be execute d by an officer of the same sex as the alleged victim 
or the officer must be assisted by such an officer. TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 18.'02l(e) {Vernon Supp. 1982-83) . If an 
assistant is use d, he or sh~ must be present during the photo-
graphing of the child. Id. Presumably, this limitation is d e -
sig ned t o insure no inappropriate behavior on the part o f the 
officer executing the warrant, although the statute does not 
elabo rate on what the role of the assistant should be in such 
cases. 
Return o f a search warrant issued under Article 18.021 is 
made by the officer taking possession of the exposed film and 
delivering it "forthwith" to the magistrate. TEX. CODE CRIM. 
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PRO. ANN. art. 18.02l(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-83). Curiously, 
the officer executing the warrant is not thereby authorized 
to remove the child from the premises except under Section 
17.03 of the Family Code. !d. Once the child is found and 
photographed, the purposes of the warrant have been served 
and other action to protect the interests of the child must 
be taken under proper authority of law other than that of 
Article 18.021. Although no cases have been decided construing 
this article, one supposes that all of these provisions will 
be held directory and not mandatory as has been done in other 
warrant execution cases. See, e.g., Barnes v. State, 504 S.W.2d 
450 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
IV. Punishment 
The punishment for Injury to a Child or an Elderly Individual 
is determined by the level of culpability involved in committing 
the crime and the degree of harm inflicted on the victim. · See 
generally, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04(b)-(d) (Vernon Supp. 
1982-83). For purposes of punishment, the three highest levels 
of injury are treated without distinction. If the actor causes 
serious bodily injury, serious physical or mental deficiency o~ 
impairment, or disfigurement or deformity, the offense is a first 
degree felony if the act is committed intentionally or knowingly. 
Reckless infliction of any of these levels of injury is a third 
























Where the lowest level of injury, bodily injury, results, 
the offense is a third degree felony if the conduct was inten-
tional or knowing. Reckless infliction of bodily ;injury on a 
child or elderly individual is a Class A misdemeanor. TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22 . 04(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-83). If crimi-
nal negligence, the lowest level of culpability, is shown, the 
offense is a Class A misdemeanor regardless of the level of 
injury inflicted. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. Sec. 22.04(d) (Vernon 
Supp. 1982-83). 
In light of the punishment scheme for Injury to a Child or 
Elderly Individual, definitions of culpability and degrees of 
injury take on increased importance. These cases ·are not like 
others in which the culpability inquiry is a limited threshold 
one which, once met by proof that some accep~able leve~ of cul-
pability exists, ceases to be relevant. Rather, the precise 
level of culpability has meaning since it is by this means that 
punishment is determined. 
The punishment scheme of Section 22.04 is less affected by 
variations in the proof of degrees of injury. Even so, a signi-
ficant difference in punishment exists between proof of bodily 
injury and the other, higher levels of injury. It is therefore 
critical that unusual care be taken in the charging of these 
crimes; introducing evidence at trial going to culpability and 
degree of injury; instructing the jury on relevant definitions; 
and structuring the punis~ent phase to properly address elements 
usually thought to be only important on guilt or innocence. 
Prosecutions brought under Section 22.04 seem especially 
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t1' ,, • 
susceptible of a form of special issue submission as is found in 
civil practice in Texas . Of course, general verdicts are now 
required in criminal cases . TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO . ANN. art . 37 . 07 
(Vernon 1979). It is therefore incumbent on the State to allege 
culpability and injury level with particularity in these cases; 
failure to do so should entitle the defendant to have the indict-
ment quashed. 
Yet another peculiarity found in Section 22 . 04 case lies in 
the unavailability of one defense common to assaults. Consent is 
apparently not a defense as in assault, aggravated assault, or 
reckless conduct. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . Sec . 22 . 06 (Vernon 
1974). 
In many respects then, Injury to a Child or Elderly Individual 
remains a new, unusual and largely unknown crime. Its peculiar 
structure and continually changing contours suggest that its future 
lies as much in the hands of appellate lawyers and the c o urts as 
in the iegislature . 
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